For opponents of capital punishment, these would appear promis ing times. Not since 1972, when the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty as then administered, has there been such palpable con cern over its use,1 reflected in the lowest levels of public opinion sup port evidenced in some time.2 This concern is mirrored in the American Bar Association's recently recommended moratorium on use of the death penalty,3 the consideration of or actual imposition of moratoria in several states,4 and even increasing doubts voiced by [Vol. 100:1336 teenagers,13 and inmates who have been "reformed" (e.g., Karla Faye Tucker in Texas).14 It is hard to identify precisely why this reexamination is occurring at this point in America's lengthy relationship with capital punish ment. Concerns over the unfair application of the death penalty due to race15 and socio-economic background,16 and the fallibility of the capi tal process, including the execution of the factually innocent,17 have been around for decades. So, too, has been skepticism over a core his toric justification of the death penalty -its supposed deterrent value -what Clarence Darrow long ago aptly dismissed as an "ancient su perstition. "1 8 At the same time, public support for the other core his toric rationale, retribution, remains strong despite decades of criticism and counter-argument, today constituting the most common basis of support among death penalty advocates.19 Nor can the increasing skep-ticism be attributed to judicial critique, given that the courts, with the Supreme Court in the lead, have essentially withdrawn from the death penalty debate. The Court, in Justice Blackmun's words, resolved some time ago to merely "tinker with the machinery of death,''20 rather than question the constitutionality of capital punishment in any fundamental way.
While recent public concern over the demonstrated flaws of the capital system is a cause for rejoicing among abolitionists, it is appar ent that the concern relates more to the "machinery" of death -how death decisions are reached -rather than the "machine" itself. In his new book, Austin Sarat21 addresses this latter concern, focusing on the system's broader effects on American law, culture and politics. In When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition, Professor Sarat explores "what the death penalty does to us, not just what it does fo r us."22 An unabashed abolitionist and prolific death penalty scholar,23 Sarat is respectful of the historic impregnability of the traditional retributivist-based justifications of the death penalty.24 True to his pragmatic orientation, he studiously eschews defense of the likes of Timothy McVeigh, whose case he calls the "ultimate trump card" of pro-death penalty forces; to Sarat, McVeigh's case is both unrepresentative in empirical terms,25 and, in a political sense, a dead-end for abolitionists. 26 Wh en the State Kills thus avoids a "frontal assault" on the philo sophical and moral justifications of capital punishment; instead, Sarat endeavors to provide a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the 22. P. 14. In adopting such an approach, Sarat echoes the words of Justice Douglas, who, addressing another ancient institution, commented: "The true curse of slavery is not [only] what it did to the black man, but what it has done to the white man." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 24. See p. 249 (noting that "it is not surprising that while traditional abolitionist argu ments have been raised repeatedly in philosophical commentary, political debate, and legal cases, none has ever carried the day in the debate about capital punishment ·in the United States").
25. This is principally because McVeigh enjoyed adequate defense counsel and his trial was the subject of enormous scrutiny and attention. Pp : 11-12.
26. According to Sarat, from the moment his face appeared in the media after arrest, with his "demeanor steely stern ... [McVelgh] quickly became the personification of the cold-blooded killer, a living, breathing endorsement of capital punishment."· P. 5. McVeigh became a "poster boy for capital punishment, the cold-blooded, mass-murderer." P. 11.
(Vol. 100:1336 many practical ways the death penalty affects the texture and sub stance of American life. The book, Sarat suggests at the outset, brings a broadened perspective to the study of the death penalty .... It points the way toward a new abolitionist politics in which the focus is not on the immorality or injustice of the death penalty as a response to killing, but is, instead, on the ways that the persistence of capital punishment affects our politics, law, and culture. (p. 16) Importantly, Sarat is not alone in his highly pragmatic orientation; his position is increasingly being voiced by death penalty opponents,27 which marks an important tactical development in the history of American abolitionism. In the following pages, I will sketch the con tours of Sarat's "new abolitionism," consider its place in the evolution of the death penalty debate, and offer some thoughts on its potential consequences and prospects for success.
I. MAPPING THE CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY
Like environmentalism, feminism, and other modern social change movements, the American anti-death penalty movement owes much to the strategic vision of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, although death penalty abolitionist efforts can be traced back to the nation's origins,2 8 the cause first took substantial root in the post-civil rights era, bearing the unmistakable earmarks of the NAACP's orchestrated campaign to dismantle state-sponsored segregation. Like the civil rights activists, the abolitionists sought re course in the courts in the hope of achieving wholesale constitutional invalidation, in lieu of piecemeal and possibly ephemeral legislative victories.
The first inkling of judicial receptivity came in 1963 with Justice Goldberg's dissent (accompanied by Justices Brennan and Douglas) from a denial of certiorari in two cases contending that the death pen- alty was disproportionate when imposed for rape.29 Taking the dissent as a signal, and mindful that the Court was not yet likely to impose a constitutional ban, abolitionist lawyers working under the auspices of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund crafted a "morato rium strategy," dedicated to attacking the procedures used in capital trials. 30 Because "death is different" from other penalties, the lawyers argued, capital trials should be characterized by greater procedural protections and rights for the accused.31 Invoking this mantra, from 1963-1972 the campaign achieved a de facto if not de jure cessation of capital punishment, as legal challenges to then-common features of the capital system created a "logjam" and brought executions to a vir tual stop. 32 In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,33 by a 5-4 vote the Court invalidated capital punishment as then practiced. Although only two justices (Brennan and Marshall) categorically condemned use of the death penalty,34 the prevailing sentiment of the three other members of the Fu rman majority was that the lack of sentencing guidance in state death regimes risked unfair and "capricious" executions in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.35 Furman's upshot was sweeping: the death sentences of over 600 individuals were invali dated, and the capital laws of some 40 jurisdictions were rendered constitutionally suspect. 36 With Furman, abolitionists succeeded in setting the death penalty on constitutional terrain, much as civil rights activists had done with racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education. The legal victory, as in Brown, suggested that the movement's tactical decision to focus on judicial relief, as opposed to battling the death penalty on the leg islative and public opinion fronts, was wise. Nonetheless, because 29. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Snider v. Cunningham, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from de nial of certiorari). The Court did not address the proportionality question with regard to rape until fourteen years later in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) , when it found the imposition of death for the rape of an adult woman to be disproportionate. 31. See [Vol. 100:1336 Furman focused only on the methods of capital schemes, not the per se constitutionality of capital punishment, abolitionists braced them selves for a resurgence of state capital laws. To this end, they endeav ored to prepare empirical studies focusing on various aspects of capital punishment, providing, if not an ironclad rationale to invalidate the death penalty, then supporting bases for judicial rulings favorable to the abolitionist cause.37
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When these new capital laws in fact materialized, they assumed one of two basic forms: those making death mandatory for certain pre scribed offenses and those affording enhanced guidance to sentencers combined with heightened procedural requirements. In 1976, the Court addressed the respective approaches: in Woodson v. North Carolina38 and Roberts v. Louisiana39 the Court invalidated mandatory death sentences, and in Gregg v. Georgia,40 the Court upheld a guided discretion approach marked by sentencing standards, bifurcated trials, and rights to appeal.41
With Gregg, the Court (by a 7-2 margin) placed its imprimatur on capital punishment, locking the abolitionist cause into a twenty-five year effort to at least improve, if not abolish, the capital system. Hav ing cast their lot with the courts, abolitionists were obliged to live with the consequences of the Court's adverse decisions, and there have been many through the years.42
To make matters worse, even apparent judicial victories have often ultimately had untoward results for abolitionism. The successful effort to have the Court recognize that "death is different" is illustrative. Ini tially invoked by Justice Brennan in his Fu rman concurrence as a basis to outlaw capital punishment,4 3 over time this recognition has actually served to shore up faith in the capital system. Starting with Gregg in 37. See 1976,44 the Court has invoked the mantra to justify an increasingly complex procedural regime affording the impression of "heightened reliability" in the capital process.45 In due course, this impression has provided a "false aura of rationality,"46 serving to allay anxiety among citizens47 and justice system actors alike.48 This constitutional cover, in tum, has afforded legislatures latitude to indulge their institutional appetite to enact ever harsher capital provisions.49 Even more per versely, according to some commentators, the "death is different" sen sibility has at times resulted in fewer procedural rights and protections afforded to capital defendants, compared to their noncapital peers.50
In short, with the exception of a precious few categorical victories outlawing death for certain offenders,51 or carving out instances when death is disproportionate to the crime or the .offender's culpability,52
44. Gregg 47. See id. at 436 (noting that "the elaborateness of the Court's death penalty jurispru dence fuels the public's impression that any death sentences that are imposed and finally upheld are the product of a rigorous -indeed, too rigorous -system of constraints").
48. See id. at 433 (noting that the procedures have "had the effect of reducing the anxi ety that judges and juries feel about exercising their sentencing power"). [W] e have constructed a [death penalty] ma chine that is extremely expensive, chokes our legal institutions, visits repeated trauma on victims' families and ultimately produces nothing like the benefits we would expect from an effective system of capital punishment. This is surely the worst of all worlds.").
54. For instance, in the 1930s and 1940s, respectively, an average of 167 and 129 persons were executed annually in the United States. In the 1950s, the average was 72. The 1960s, however, witnessed a marked decrease, with an average of 19, followed by virtual cessation of executions in the 1970s (a total of 3), and only 12 annual executions averaged in the 1980s. It is against this intellectual and historical backdrop that Professor Sarat has produced When the State Kills. In the book, Sarat con sciously distances himself from those who have sought to address the death penalty as a "matter of moral argument and policy debate" (p. 14). Also absent from the book is evidence of traditional jurispru dential or empirical argument and analysis. True to his longstanding "cultural studies" orientation,6 3 Sarat goes deep, evaluating the perni cious ways in which he contends the death penalty has influenced, and continues to influence, American politics, law, and culture. The struc ture of the book conforms to this strategy: Part I is entitled " State  Killing By "politics" Sarat means something other than the verity that the death penalty is a product of the democratic process with high salience to elected officials.64 Rather, Sarat invokes the term in a broader sense, surveying the corrosive influence of the death penalty on the nation's democratic traditions and values. Sarat suggests that capital punishment is "incompatible with democratic values": it is tpe "ulti mate assertion of righteous indignation, of power pretending to its own infallibility" (p. 16). This governmental hubris, in the face of the ineradicable finality of execution, Sarat contends, is at odds with the "spirit of openness, of reversibility, of revision" he posits as necessary to democracy (p. 16). Moreover, Sarat is concerned that individuals, as a result of their service on capital juries and their state citizenship, be come complicit in state killing; this complicity "contradicts and dimin ishes the respect for the worth or dignity of all persons that is the enli vening value of democratic politics" (pp. 16� 17).
Sarat 67. Payne, 501 U. S. at 819 (permitting consideration of "evidence relating to a particular victim or to the harm that a .capital defendant causes a victim's family"). In renouncing Booth, the Court also further distanced itself from its "death is different" rationale. In Booth, the Court was at pains to emphasize that victim impact evidence was permissible in noncapital trials but not capital trials because of the uniquely severe penalty at stake. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12. Payne obliterated this distinction.
about-face in the name of procedural fairness, permitting the state to "balance" the personal loss of survivors against the virtually unfet tered right of defendants to present mitigating evidence,68 the outcome owed as much, if not more, to politics. With a conservative majority now firmly in control,69 the Payne Court's renunciation of Booth evinced a' plain sensitivity to the potent "voice" of the victims' move ment.70 As Sarat astutely recognizes, the potency of the movement stems both from its basic empathetic appeal and the government's felt need to fortify the political legitimacy of its justice system, of late harshly criticized for b e ing· insufficiently sensitive to the needs of crime victims and their survivors.71 Sarat condudes, however, that this effort to shore up the basic weakness of the state in the end only exac erbates its frailty, evidencing a governing philosophy motivated by "fear and anger" (p: 58).
Second, Payne has made capital decisions themselves "more per sonal, more emotional, and more specific" (p. 43). By permitting the personal stories of survivor loss and victim value to permeate· capital trials, Sarat observes, the Court allo ' wed passion to be "introduced into the temple of reason" (p. 43); the Court " brought revenge out of the shadows and accorded it an honored place in the jurisprudence of capital punishment" (p. 45). Again, this shift, Sarat notes, suggests the influence of an enervated governing sensibility in which "all institu tions are judged by their responsiveness to private preferences" (p. 58), rather than broader public good. While heeding the "voice" of victims seems at first blush to have a salutary effect, binding citizens to their common prospect of victimhood, Sarat sees it as ultimately a sop of transitory value. This is because by erasing the line between private vengeance and public retribution, the legal system disserves itself: it undercuts the trust in impartially dispensed justice necessary to citi zens' faith in democratic governance (pp. 57-58). 70. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the ban "con flict(ed] with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement."); id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority "has obviously been moved by an argument that has strong political appeal"). [Vol. 100:1336
To these observations, one might add, the state's continued em brace of the death penalty· can actually impede, not promote, the in terests of victims and their survivors in two basic ways. The first turns on the very availability of the death penalty, as opposed to some lesser sanction. As I have argued elsewhere, "there is no monolithic 'every victim' "72 -victims, and their survivors, have different views-on capi tal punishment.73 As a result, pro-capital decisions inevitably serve to marginalize those who oppose capital punishment.74 Conversely, be cause death is actually sought in only a relative. handful of murders, and imposed in fewer still,75 the perceived worth of some victims is in evitably diminished in the minds of some.76 The variability of capital punishment thus significantly enhances the perception -indeed, re ality -that life is unevenly valued and justice is inconsistently dispensed.77 74. An example of this heterogeneity is manifest in the national organization Murder Victims' Families of Reconciliation, whose web site reads:
In our society there is an institutional bias in favor of killing people who kill, and a prescrip tive attitude towards survivors of murder victims that we need the execution of killers to re cover from the trauma ... .
[A]s survivors who oppose the death penalty, we are often treated with derision for our views, our affections for our loved one are challenged, and we become, in effect, "second class" victims. In the eyes of some in law enforcement and some members of the public at large, we are individuals not worthy of the same type of attention and support accorded to The victim's mother cries out for the murderer to be executed and is dissatisfied with any lesser penalty, precisely because the death penalty is available as the most substantial re sponse to willful killing in the United States at this time. Because it is available, any lesser penalty would depreciate the significance of the crime and would confer second-class status on the life, and the circumstances of the death, of the victim. The frustrated response and the outrage are a function of the existence of the death penalty.
Studies showing that murders involving black victims are less likely to be prosecuted capitally further suggest such a devaluation. See The second negative effect relates to the emotional consequences of the death penalty on-survivors. As has often been noted, it remains unclear whether execution can provide "closure" to survivors.78 Moreover, as Professor Susan Bandes has observed, "different victims have different needs, and ... an individual victim's needs may change over time"'.7 9 -variables that the unequivocal sanction of death often cannot accommodate. Professor Bandes quite rightly notes that we should be careful to distinguish the question of what victims need from the ques tion of what the legal system ought to provide. Some of what individual victims or survivors need to attain closure must come from psychological, religious and social support systems. Such systems have greater ability to individuate among victims and to accommodate the shifting and complex needs of particular victims. They are not obligated to reach a fixed and categorical judgment, or any legal judgment at all. Moreover, they are not obligated to weigh a host of other factors against the victim's needs, including the rights of the defendant and the good of society as a whole.80
Along these same lines, the capital process itself can be harmful to survivors, forcing them to endure the drawn-out litigation process, during which the condemned becomes the focus of attention and the merits of his or her case are publicly debated. 81 This public focus on the condemned is only heightened at the theoretic moment of most satisfaction to survivors, the actual execution, because as Professors Zimring and Hawkins explain, the death penalty "chang[ es] the sub ject ... from crime to punishment."82 The McVeigh execution exemplisions); see also Richard Willing, Prosecutor Oft en Determines Which Way a Case Will Go, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1999, at 6A (noting that "the single most important step in the proc ess comes first, when the local prosecutor decides how to handle the case and whether the defendant will face the death penalty"). [Vol. 100:1336 fied this, with the world fixated on the death chamber in Terre Haute, lndiana,83 despite the professed desire of the media to focus on the vic tims and survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing. 84
In short, contrary to conventional thinking on the subject, the needs of victims and their survivors are not necessarily congruent with capital punishment, and abolitionists would be wise to emphasize this distinction. As Peter Hodgkinson has pointed out, "[t]he trial is not the place to consider the very legitimate needs and rights of the fami lies and friends of the victim. Rather, there should, in effect, be a sepa rate victim justice system."85 Equally important, abolitionists must emphasize that " [v] ictims' needs and rights should not be met at the expense of humane, effective, and proportional responses to off enders and their needs should not be confused with or influence the treat ment of offenders."86 By highlighting these important distinctions, abolitionists can both diminish the reflexive positive connection made between the death penalty and victims' rights, and align themselves with the politically appealing cause of victims,87 without being accused of manipulation and pandering, as the government (rightfully) has. 88 explicit recognition of the needs and rights of victims. What is needed is not a cynical adop tion of a victim-friendly strategy but rather the acceptance that homicide victims and those that survive them have inherent needs that should be recognized. The failure to do so has driven many moderate, perhaps anti-death penalty victims' families, reluctantly, into the arms of the pro-lobby who can and do offer succor and 'solutions' to the hurt, anger, and frustration experienced by such families.
86. Id at 651.
87.
See JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS 119-41 (1999) (describing powerful empathic appeal of victim imagery and evolution of "the victim industry"); Bruce Shapiro, Victims & Vengeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment is a Bad Idea, NATION, Feb. 10, 1997, at 11 (noting that "[i)n the lan guage of American politics today, victims of violent crime are accorded uniquely sanctified status").
As Robert Elias has written:
May 2002]
In Chapter Three, Sarat elaborates on the broader effects of the political compromises he sees as demanded by· continued resort to the death penalty. In "Killing Me Softly: Capital Punishment and the Technologies for Taking Life," Sarat chronicles the ongoing efforts by government to devise execution methods that are "humane" and "painless." Sarat succinctly describes the technological journey from the rope and gun to the chair, to the needle, and points in between. Grounding his analysis ·.in Michel Foucault's work,89 Sarat observes that the overall historic trajectory has been to make executions less a matter of public drama and more one of "mundane technique" (p. 67). This "search for a painless way of killing those who kill," he notes, "is somewhat unsettling and paradoxical" (p. 63). Indeed, "[w]hy should the state be concerned about the suffering of those it puts to death?" (p. 63).
The answer Sarat offers is that the state must do so in the name of a "legitimization strategy": to engender the idea that it is imposing a "painless" death,i which serves to demarcate the state's "civilized" ex tinction of life, in contrast to the ''savage" killing perpetrated by the condemned.90 In a corollary sense, the state seeks to retain control over the iconographic territory "by not allowing those condemned to die to assume the status of victims of outmoded technologies of death" (p. 82). According to Sarat: "We kill gently not out of concern for the condemned but rather to establish vividly a hierarchy between the law-abiding and the lawless" (p. 82). To Sarat the evolution toward le thal injection has allowed Americans to "kill with a pretense of hu manity ... [and] believe themselves to be the guardians of a moral or der that, in part, bases its claims to superiority on its condemnation of killing. "91
Sarat's incisive analysis overlooks a perhaps more basic motivation of "humane" executions, however. To be sure, the brutal imagery of recent botched executions (electrocution, in particular) provides a Especially in recent years, the political use of victims has helped promote government power '· and justify our hardline response. Victims could as easily represent the state's failure, but by coopting victims and the victim movement, the state may use them to portray its apparent concern and promote its legitimacy instead. As such, victims may help perform an ideologi cal and political function ....
ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS, VICTIMOLOGY AND H UMAN RIGHTS 233 (1986).
89. See TEXAS, 1923 TEXAS, -1990 , at 147 (1994) (recounting an execution where "the reac tion to the drugs induced a violent choking, gasping and writhing on the gurney -so much so that one witness fainted").
[Vol. 100:1336 strong incentive for the state to explore ways to kill with less brutality and to thus maintain its magisterial stance.92 But in focusing exclu sively on the nuanced meanings of the state's motivation, Sarat under plays the coercive threat of a traditional Eighth Amendment claim, one of the few remaining constitutional bases for challenging the death penalty. As recent experience in Florida and elsewhere demon strates, Eighth Amendment claims, although perhaps old-fashioned and "frontal," remain a formidable catalyst for change.93 Interestingly, the ostensibly benign "restraining hand of the law" (p. 84), might itself have been subverted to legitimize state killing, providing "cover" for what Sarat conceives as an otherwise indefensible state action. One is left wishing that Sarat had trained his formidable analytic skills on this provocative issue.94
Beyond this, however, Sarat's analysis is surely on point in its rec ognition of the ironic effect of the state's effort to execute in a puta tively more humane fashion. The irony lies in the state's effort to si multaneously cater to the often vengeful desires of survivors, epitomized in Payne, while executing those it condemns in what ap pears to be a nonvengeful, painless manner for public relations rea sons (p. 69). Since Wh en the State Kill s was published, it has indeed become apparent that technological "advances" designed to maintain the legitimacy of capital regimes95 might actually undercut the appeal of executions. Survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing expressed profound dissatisfaction over the clinical, expedient nature of 92. The legerdemain was not lost on one Ohio death row inmate who, provided the statutory choice between injection and the state's 104-year-old electric chair, insisted on the latter in the hope of graphically illustrating the execution process. Francis X. Clines, Inmate's Chosen Means of Execution Starts New Debate: Ohio is Considering Ban on Electric Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at A14. According to his lawyer, the inmate felt the execution " 'shouldn't be like taking the family pet to the vet's to have him quietly put to sleep.' " Id. " 'He wants taxpayers to understand they play a role in executions and the killing can't be sanitized.' " Id. 95. By embracing lethal injection, as journalist Susan Blaustein has noted, the govern ment "has turned dying into a still life, thereby enabling the state to kill without anyone in volved feeling anything at all." Susan Blaustein, Witness to Another Execution, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 54, at 387, 399. Death by needle is thus a "non event." Id. "We have perfected the art of institutional killing to the degree that it has dead ened our natural, quintessentially human response to death." Id.
McVeigh's execution, with some stating that life without parole would have exacted a harsher, more condign toll.96 Perhaps more ominous, a federal jury in the capital trial of Mohamed al-'Owhali, convicted of bombing the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, rejected a death sentence in part because the sterile ritual of lethal injection was "very humane and the defendant will not suffer."97 If it perhaps goes too far to say that the situation "precipitate[ s] a crisis of legitimacy,"98 it surely puts death penalty jurisdictions in an uncomfortable position. They must satisfy the felt governmental need to kill humanely, but still satisfy the bloodlust of survivors who feel they have a rightful place at the table of justice. A tall order to satisfy; to be sure, yet one of the govern ments' own making.
B. The Legal Effects
Part II of When The State Kills focuses on how the death penalty corrodes legal process and values. In perhaps the most compelling of the part's three chapters, "Capital Trials and the Ordinary World of State Killing,'' Sarat recounts his experience observing the capital trial of William Brooks, an African American prosecuted in Georgia for the rape-murder of a white female. His choice of the Brooks trial, as opposed to a more high-profile trial such as McVeigh's, is no coinci dence; in selecting a run-of-the-mill capital prosecution, Sarat seeks to shed light on how "the business of the killing state is done beyond the glare of the media attention."99 Sarat, as has become fashionable,100 regards the capital process in dramaturgical terms rich in legal and social significance.101 As Sarat 2000) (predicting that "the reshaping of the death penalty into a sanitized and routinized disposal process .. . may actually hasten its obsoles cence" and that the death penalty's "superfluousness as penal policy and practice will likely be revealed"). 
. " ). Sarat elaborates:
The opportunity to talk about violence and to distinguish capital punishment from murder occurs in those rare moments -capital trials -when both are spoken about at once. As a (Vol. 100:1336 portrays it, to the State of Georgia, Brooks's rape and murder of Carol Galloway embodied the age-old construct of a murderous black male preying on a pure and virtuous white female. By means both subtle and overt the prosecutor endeavored to keep the penalty . question on this familiar terrain to establish Brooks's "otherness" so as to make it easier to cast him from the human circle.102 The government's case was thus reduced to an easily digestible, "simple morality tale, a reassuring sentimental narrative," which jurors could use to justify the "engine of state killing" (p. 93).
·
The defense, for its part, did its best to convince jurors of the de fendant's humanity, by means of a similar narrative strategy. Rather than trying to excuse Brooks's murderous act, the defense sought to contextualize it within his own brutalized personal life, to provide ju rors with a reason to exercise mercy, showing the "pain and victimiza tion" he himself endured in life prior to the murder (p. 107). In so do ing, Sarat recognizes, the defense relied upon "the cultural power of the idea of victimization even as it trie[ d] to refigure and complicate that idea. "103
Sarat is surely correct in his assessment that narrative has played, and continues to play, a central role in capital trials. The problem, ac cording to Sarat, lies in two consequences of its use. The first is that narrative tends to unduly "flatten" and "simplify" capital trials and create fertile soil for crass "cultural oppositions," which too oftenas in Brooks's trial -play into racist fears and stereotypes (p. 106). The second is that the simplifying quality of narrative conduces to the construction of overly simplistic, mutually exclusive explanatory sto ries by the prosecution and defense, respectively: that the defendant's act was one of demonstrable free will or the result of deterministic forces beyond his control (p. 116).
result, such trials, whether celebrated or not, are cr ucial and unusually revealing moments in the life of the Jaw. P. 89; cf Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cf. REV. 305, 385 (noting that "(t]he criminal trial is a 'miracle play' of government in which we can carry out our inarticu late beliefs about crime and criminals within the reassuring formal structure of disinterested due process"). 103. P. 107. Sarat also notes that the trial was rounded out by a third narrative, one that in fact was nonexistent as a matter of law: descriptions of death house procedures, and the physical experience of the condemned at the moment of execution. The information is barred on the rationale that it is irrelevant as it constitutes neither mitigating nor aggravating evidence. See In Chapter Six, Sarat builds upon the role of narrative, focusing on its use by appellate counsel for death row inmates. Sarat extols what he sees as the virtuous, thankless work of a small cadre of dedicated counsel104 and is enthusiastic about the positive role of narrative in the abolitionist cause. According to Sarat:
All lawyers traffic in narrative, but narrative plays a particularly impor tant role in the work of lawyers trying to end state killing .... [Death penalty lawyers] construct narratives first to humanize their clients and second to connect their clients' fates with broader social and political concerns. In so doing, they make a powerful political claim even in an era when the odds of ending capital punishment are so heavily stacked against them. (pp. 181-82): Individual stories of the condemned thus provide fodder for the broader political effort to end state-sanctioned killing. 105 They serve an "archival" role that Sarat sees as critically important to the long-term goal of abolitionism:
Death penalty lawyers use the legal process as an archive, a place to rec ord and preserve their deeply held views of justice so that, someday, they may be retrieved and so that the killing state someday may be disman tled. They turn to the law to carry on a political struggle .... Although death penalty lawyers ... often cannot save their clients' lives, perhaps saving the client's story may be valuable for the political effort to end capital punishment.106
According to Sarat, "[i]n an era when saving the lives of those con demned to die is so difficult, saving stories may be all the more valu able" (p. 184).
What Sarat fails to recognize -or at least acknowledge -in Part II is that narrative cuts both ways. This blind spot evidences itself not just in Sarat's almost exclusive focus on the negative outgrowths of only the state's use of narrative at trial. It is also apparent in his une quivocal endorsement of narrative by appellate counsel for the con demned.107 Why should it not also be accurate to say that narrative 104. According to Sarat, appellate capital defenders "are the last line of defense in the effort to prevent executions. These men and women carry the burden of representing some of the most hated persons in American society .... The success of their work is crucial in determining when the state kills and how much state killing there will be in the United States." P. 160
105. See p. 177 (noting that "[d]eath penalty lawyering thus requires a concerted effort to write an enduring story, a story told to an audience present only in the imagination"); p. 177 (noting the "broader political work of putting history into narrative").
106. P. 162; see also p. 168 (asserting that "[d]eath penalty lawyers use narrative to buy time for their clients, but even when they fail, they seek to preserve their clients' stories").
107. This positive portrayal of the defense bar·, frequently criticized as obstructionist foot soldiers for abolitionism, contrasts with the public relations astuteness that permeates other parts of the book. Disdain for capital defenders, for instance, has been voiced by Jus tice Scalia with characteristic flair. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maligning "[t]he heavily outnumbered opponents of capital punish ment" engaged in "a guerilla war" who make capital sentencing a "practical impossibility").
(Vol. 100:1336 when used by death penalty foes also "flattens" and distorts the death decision making process? Does not the use of narrative by the defense also contribute to the increasing "personalization" of capi�al trials, so eloquently condemned by Sarat earlier in the book?108 Inevitably, by appealing to pathos and emotion, defense use. of narrative undercuts the avowed goal of achieving a "reasoned moral response" to defen dants and their crimes.109 Beyond raising constitutional concern, opening the floodgates of. emotion only adds to the public perception that the system is arbitrary and out of control,110 and unduly influenced by melodramatic spectacle.111 Moreover, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed, emotionalism is not a territory on which abolitionists should be eager to wage battle, given that emotion is "far more likely to turn the jury against a capital defendant than for him. "112 In ulti mate terms, therefore, the question is not so much whether narrative and emotion are available and will be used. The question is to what ends are they to be legitimately put and what legal and moral conse quences flow as a result.113
Sarat's advocacy of inmate "stories" for broader political purposes, moreover, is itself interesting in that it highlights a central tension in abolitionist strategy. For some time, as soci�l movements historian Herbert Haines has observed, conflict has existed between abolitionist activists and capital defenders over which should take precedence: the short-term goal of evading or overturning particular death verdicts or the long-term goal of abolitionism, goals that at times work at cross purposes.114 As Haines observes, "[p]rofessional ethics require diligent 108. For instance, at one point Sarat asserts that defendants' "narratives test the power of the victims' rights movement, making space to claim that their clients too are victims." P. 172.
109. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."). It is worth noting that Sarat's characterization of appellate defense counsel serving both as advocates for abolition, and for their particular clients, suggests that Haines overstates the division between the litigator and activist camps. The dual role, however, itself presents an defense lawyers to take the side of their clients in public, but most ac tivists now seem to understand that any focusing of attention on the sympathetic qualities of inmates must be done with the utmost care."115 The risk, as Haines notes, is that abolitionists will be viewed as being "in sympathy with criminals .... Activists have a great deal of work to do to overcome this view, and part of their success in doing so will be determined by the finesse with which they manage the pres ence of condemned killers in the American imagination."116
With his advocacy of litigation "stories," Sarat signals his contin ued fealty to "lawyerly" abolitionism, s�eming to ignore the hard learned lesson that successful trial tactics do not always translate posi tively to the public.117 This oversight is curious because When the State Kills otherwise evinces an acute sensitivity to the potentially adverse public relations effects of abolitionist strategy. Later, in the closing pages of the book, Sarat echoes Haines when he harshly criticizes ef forts to publicly humanize condemned inmates, chiefly McVeigh, but also Missouri death row denizens, the latter by the Italian clothing company Benetton by means of a pictorial catalog with personalizing information ("We, On Death Row"). To Sarat, the two efforts re quired anti-death penalty forces to "take on the political burden of explaining" that which is politically unsustainable (pp. 249-50). It is interesting question. To Sarat, appellate counsel serve as "historians": "making a record thus links lawyering for an individual client with the broader, political goal of ending state killing in an imagined future." P. 181. This position is consistent with Sarat's prior work with Stuart Scheingold. See CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). But should capital counsel "build a record" for any purpose other than to benefit their immediate clients? One litigator, for instance, told Sarat that counsel must tell courts what they don't want to hear. We ha ve to be willing to say what they would rather we not say, things that today will be called irrelevant or frivolous. We have to do this because at some point in time, even in cases we lose, we are not going to have the chance ten years from now to go back and complete the story. We have to do it now ... I think that the greatest service I can do for a client before he is executed is to be sure that they will not go anony mously, quietly, that they will be part of history. hard enough, Sarat suggests, to defend a capital defendant in the real time world of capital trials; it is "impossible to do so in the hurly-burly of political contest."118 The reader is obliged to ask, however: how do these humanizing efforts differ, logically, from telling and archiving the "stories" of the condemned individual denizens of death row? More practically, why do such stories hold more promise for aboli tionist success than Benetton's campaign and sympathetic accounts of McVeigh's personal background, which he·so harshly criticizes?
Sarat unfortunately does not provide answers, leaving unaddressed a tactical problem that has vexed the abolitionist cause for some time. In the end, the problem arguably does not lie so much in principle but in application. Abolitionists can achieve success by putting a "human face" on the condemned but they would be well-advised to be selec tive about the faces they proffer for public consumption. The visage and life story of McVeigh, for instance, might not inspire empathy or anti-capital sentiment, but that of a wrongfully condemned man freed from death row logically will.
C. The Cultural Effects
In the book's final part, Sarat shifts his focus to the "cultural repre sentations and resonances of capital punishment, the connection be tween what we see and what we believe! about state killing and the American condition" (pp. 28-29). Sarat recognizes that punishment generally, and capital punishment in particular, holds importance for its instructional value -what Sarat calls the "pedagogy of the scaf fold" (p. 23). By this he means something more than the age-old ca nard that the death penalty will deter those privileged to witness the state's awesome exercise of raw power.119 Rather, Sarat is interested in 118. P. 249. In a footnote, Sarat elaborates on why Benetton's effort was a "step backward" for the abolitionist cause:
It asks readers to identify, or at least sympathize, with those on death row, reminding us that whatever they have done they have the capacity to love and be loved, to hope and fear, to laugh, and to repent. There is no reason to think that another such effort, no matter how glamorous or powerful its sponsor, will succeed. Indeed, there is reason to fear that it will distract attention from the issues that today may be changing attitudes toward the death penalty.
P. 312 n.13. For a similar observation, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 133-34 (stating that "[t]he idealization of the denizens of death row" obscures "the most powerful argument against execution in a liberal democracy and the most fundamental of all argu ments against the death penalty": the offender's basic humanity, not his personal traits or prior good works).
119. ·see Michael Madow, Fo rbidden Spectacle: Ex ecutions, the Public and the Press in Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 477 (1995). Of course, this notion had to compete with the empirical reality that the witnessing crowds were crime-prone, and vola tile, which over time encouraged governments to carry out executions in more private ven ues. See 
LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at 29-30 (1989).
the methods of execution and how they are portrayed (or not) by gov ernment, and how this affects our "condition." He explores this rich terrain by reflecting upon an interesting historical development: while over the past several decades executions themselves have come to be conducted behind prison walls, often at night and witnessed by a select few, the American movie industry has made executions and the stories of condemned prisoners the frequent focus of attention. Sarat uses this contrast to good effect, exploring the significance of the state's refusal to permit public consumption of first-hand visual imagery of execu tions and how this vacuum has been filled by Hollywood.
In Chapter Seven, "To See or Not to See: On Televising Execu tions," Sarat contemplates the practical and symbolic meaning of the state's blackout of executions.12° To Sarat, there is no mistaking the practical motivation: limiting the visibility of state-imposed death is "part of the modern bureaucratization of capital punishment and the strategy for transforming execution from an arousing public spectacle of vengeance to a soothing matter of mere administration."121 Like the state's embrace of the clean and clinical execution method of lethal injection122 and the preclusion in capital trials of evidence relating to the physical effects of actual executions,123 Sarat sees the sequestration of death as part of a broader effort to render less visceral the ultimate consequence of capital law. In symbolic terms, sequestration contrib utes to the "silencing of the condemned" (p. 189) and the "relative in visibility" of state killing (p. 191), which together contribute to the po litical sustainability of the death penalty.
Making an argument that owes as much to Brandeis124 as it does to Foucalt,125 Sarat vigorously argues that executions should be televised. 125. FOUCAULT, supra note 89 (arguing that the evolution of the criminal justice system over the centuries has been marked by an increasing effort to hide from view the state's pe nological methods).
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He takes as his foil Professor Wendy Lesser who, in a prior book, urged that executions not be televised because doing so would be in decent and voyeuristic: " 'We, from the invisibility of our private living rooms, are given the opportunity to peer into the most intimate event in someone else's life: his death.' "126 This invasion, Lesser asserts, would be in " 'extremely bad taste' " (p. 205). Sarat, with justification, skewers Lesser for her squeamishness, but not on this ground alone. To Sarat, "[t]he death of the condemned is in no sense just his own death. And the question of whether executions should be televised is more than a question of manners" (p. 205).
Sarat sees the question, ultimately, as a political one. According to Sarat, "[t]elevising executions would mean changing the terms of con trol, removing state killing from the bureaucratic domain, and recog nizing its political configuration" (p. 206). "Control over vision is . .. a question of control over execution itself" (p. 205); "the elision of the visual helps state killing to appear different from violence outside of law" (p. 207). Televising executions, Sarat urges, is therefore "one way of contesting the bureaucratic cover-up" (p. 207). In adopting this po sition, Sarat recognizes that television might understate an important prong of the abolitionist argument -the broader human effects of execution (e.g., the years on death row, the damage to the families of the condemned) -and "fool us into thinking that we understand what is in truth inaccessible" (p. 199). However, to him the solution lies in "more searching media scrutiny of the entire process of execution."127
Even if one agrees with the governmental transparency argument, it is debatable whether televising executions will facilitate abolition. The imagery will likely have some effect; the question is what form it will take. As Richard Sherwin has recently written, "[o]nce you enter the realm of appearances it may be difficult to control how the image spins. "128 Sarat appears confident that the visage of execution will itself threaten the status quo ante of the killing state;129 that the intrinsic humanity of the viewing public will recoil from the savagery once it is
P. 205 (quoting WENDY LESSER, PICTURES AT AN EXECUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SUBJECT OF MURDER 40 (1993)).
127. Pp. [199] [200] . Sarai fails to explain, however, why the television industry would un dertake such a "more searching" inquiry. Indeed, there is every reason to think that, as with virtually all else in the ratings-driven industry, television will seek sensationalism and graphic display, and not distinguish itself in a positive way. Thus, if in fact the inevitable snapshot imagery does provide a misleadingly narrow portrayal of capital punishment, Sarat's position would appear to be undercut. actually viewed.13° However, it is entirely possible that, in an era in which the muted visage of lethal injection has become the norm, pub lic outrage over state killing will be similarly muted. As much was sug gested by the prevalent response that McVeigh's death was too "easy," an unjustifiably humane and dignified means of providing "just deserts;"131 Thus, in ultimate terms, while televising executions might be laud able in democratic principle, it remains uncertain whether the sunlight cast on this dark crevice of the law will benefit the abolitionist cause.132 This is especially so if public viewing of executions becomes more common and less sensational, a likely occurrence in an era when the gripping travails of "Reality TV'' initially garnered high viewer ratings that have since leveled off considerably. 132. Support for this view was evidenced in the joust between Justices Blackmun and Scalia in Callins. Blackmun, at the outset of his dissent, darkly intoned the following descrip tion of Callins's impending execution: "Intravenous tubes attached to his arms will carry the instrument of death, a toxic fluid designed specifically for the purpose of killing human be ings." Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Scalia countered that Callins's demise was preferable to that of his victim, who was "ripped by a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly, with no opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs, and left to bleed to death on the floor of a tavern. The death-by-injection which Justice Blackmun describes looks pretty desirable next to that." Id. at 1142 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). Scalia then proceeded to ridicule his colleague for choos ing a comparatively benign murder, unlike the brutal rape and murder of an eleven-year-old girl in another case then before the Court, adding: "How enviable. a quiet death by lethal injection compared with that!" Id. at 1143. 135. This view is shared by seasoned deat h penalty lawyer David Bruck, whom Lesser quotes: "The truth of the matter is that the public's imagination of what it must be like -(Vol. 100:1336
Americans, however, are not totally bereft of visual imagery of capital punishment. The movie industry has come to the rescue, pro viding fictionalized accounts of death row denizens in numerous films, spanning several decades. These film depictions have catered to the modern human craving for visual images, the appeal of which, as Walter Lippmann noted, is that they seemingly come "directly to us without human meddling, [making them] the most effortless food of the mind conceivable."136 Movies thus enjoy : a compelling quasi verisimilitude, enhanced by the dramatic talents of Hollywood. The upshot is that movies today have complemented, and pervasively in fluenced, what Sarat calls "our own legitimating narratives" of capital punishment (p. 207).
With this background, Sarat provides in the book's final chapter an incisive analysis of three movies released in the 1990s that have filled the visual void, productions he considers "important interventions in the debate about capital punishment": Dead Man Walking, Last Dance, and The Green Mile (p. 211). Sarat regards the films as signifi cant not so much for any revelations they contain but rather for their dramaturgical value; the films are worthy objects of analysis because of their "cultm;al politics" and "the way they convey knowledge of capital punishment" (p. 211).
Sarat provides a painstaking analysis of the three films, ultimately criticizing them for their tendency to legitimize state killing. His first basis for concern is that the films, to varying degrees, highlight and ul timately foster simplistic views of individual blame and responsibility, much as government prosecutors themselves do in capital trials. By fo cusing on what is often portrayed as the unalloyed free will of actors (i.e., whether the condemned ."did it"), Sarat reasons, the films at once provide the viewing public an explanation for violent criminal behav ior and a justification for state killing (i.e., the condemned "deserves" to die). In Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, this takes the form of condemned individuals trying to reconcile before death their admitted barbarous acts; the Green Mile, in turn, constitutes a passion play in which a wrongly condemned, Christ-like inmate struggles unsuccess fully to avoid the death penalty.
As Sarat observes, there is a practical reason for the films' strategy to cast capital punishment in stark terms of moral responsibility and blame: the social and structural conditions that figure in the lives of and I say this having seen two of these executions take place -the public's imagination is much truer than what they would see on TV." LESSER, supra note 126, at 142.
STUART EWEN, PR! A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 153 (1996) (quoting Lippmann).
See generally THE PERSISTENCE OF HISTORY: CINEMA, TELEVISION, AND THE MODERN EVENT (Vivian Sobchack ed., 1996). the condemned would complicate the narrative.137 The films are domi nated by a " 'bilateral individualism,' a response to crime that ignores or brackets the difficult question of what kinds of social conditions breed crime."138 Sarat thus sees the films as the embodiment of a "con servative cultural politics," despite the overt impression that they are predominantly abolitionist in nature (p. 213). They are conservative because they view crime purely as a matter of personal autonomythe "narrative of responsibility" (p. 228) -channeling viewer focus toward this unadorned question, suggesting that it is tQ.e end-all of the capital punishment debate.139
Sarat's second primary concern relates to the way in which the films portray actual executions. The films, he writes, "are unusually preoccupied with the techniques and technologies of execution, showing, often in minute detail, how those technologies work and what their effects are on the body of the condemned" (p. 233). Such representations falsely "convey a confident comprehensiveness" (p. 238) and include inter alia, from the Green Mile (set in circa 1930s Louisiana), the botched electrocution of an inmate. This mishap, Sarat infers, is to be taken as a reassurance that there should be no concern when government carries out a "normal" execution (p. 239). At bot tom, then, film representations of actual executions are also culturally conservative, and serve the broader cause of preserving the practice of state killing.
Sarat's analysis is accurate as far as it goes. The celluloid version of state killing is surely uni-dimensional, and this tendency likely abets the continued use of capital punishment. However, one is left to won der whether Sarat is asking too much of Hollywood. The movies, after all, are just that -movies; they are commercial products created and promoted to appeal to the mass consuming public.140 As such, it should be expected that they would conform to the formulaic demands of the Hollywood idiom, and yes, be cast in a "culturally conservative" way conducive to the legal . status quo. Nor can we realistically expect 137. See p. 232 (stating that the films "refute broad narratives of responsibility that would implicate us all in the circumstances that produce crime and would undermine the moral and legal scaffolding on which the apparatus of punishment is built"). In real life, we do not have that indulgence"). Dow argues that, compared to documentaries, which most often focus on innocence, fictional films "do a far better job of illuminating the entirety of the death penalty world," insofar as they address the "moral complexity" of the system independent of innocence. Id. at 512, 514.
140. As David Dow has recently written, "[w]hen it comes to death, most Hollywood movies cheat. They cheat by tinkering with the truth, because the truth as it actually is is too complex or too disturbing to confront honestly." Dow, supra note 139, at 511.
[Vol. 100:1336 profit-driven Hollywood to tackle "large questions about what state killing does to our law, politics, and our culture," as Sarat urges (p. 213).
III. SARAT'S "NEW ABOLITIONISM"
In the conclusion of Wh en the State Kill s, Sarat elaborates on his "new abolitionism," and offers some insight into the unabashed prag matic motivation behind its origin. As he does throughout the book, Sarat holds fast to the view that capital punishment has a pernicious influence on America's law, politics and culture.141 In the final pages, however, Sarat reaches beyond the cultural studies orientation that predominates in the book and embraces more conventional, systemic concerns, similar to those motivating Justice Blackmun's famous aboli tionist conversion in Callins v. Collins142 and the death penalty mora toria movement.143 To Sarat, these developments lie with the grain of his new abolitionism,144 despite the fact that both Blackmun's conver sion and the moratoria were motivated by concern over system mal function,145 with attendant constitutional implications, rather than the more nuanced "cultural" harms identified by Sarat in the body of his 141. See, e.g., p. 250 ("[S]tate killing diminishes our democracy, legitimating vengeance, intensifying racial divisions, and distracting us from the new challenges that the new century poses for America. It promises simple solutions to complex problems and offers up moral simplicity in a morally ambiguous world.").
142. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145, 1157 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (concluding, after twenty years of "tinker[ing] with the machinery of death," that "the death penalty cannot be administered in accord with our Constitution"). 144. See p. 259 (stating that they have succeeded in "calling our attention to the condi tion of America, its laws, its culture, its commitments as a way of framing the debate about state killing"); pp. 259-60 ("[T]hey remind us that the post-Furman effort to rationalize death sentencing has utterly failed and has been replaced by a policy that favors execution while trimming away procedural protection for capital defendants."); p. 260 (they have re minded us of "the spirit of vengeance and cultural division that attend the death penalty").
145. In Blackmun's case, his late-in-life reversal was fueled by a palpable frustration over, among other things, the persistent failure of capital systems to accommodate the dual requirements of individualization and consistency in juror death decisionmaking:
[D)espite the efforts of the States and the courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules ... the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake .... Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrari ness and discrimination from the administration of death ... can never be achieved without compromising an equally essential component of fundamental fairness -individualized sentencing.
·
Callins, 510 U.S. at 1144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For its part, the ABA advocated a moratorium in the name of "fixing" a long list of unaddressed pro. blems with the capital system, and avoided a categorical bar "based on the morality or the advis ability of capital punishment per se." See A.B.A., supra note 3, at 15; see also id. at 1 (ac knowledging that "the Association takes no position on the death penalty").
book.146 This apparent disconnect, however, is ultimately of little effect because Sarat is able to successfully argue that the systemic concerns motivating Justice Blackmun and the moratoria provide yet another amoral, pragmatic basis to resist state killing that comports with his new abolitionism: that the death penalty cannot be "administered in a manner that is compatible with our legal system's fundamental com mitments to fair and equal treatment."147
To Sarat, such an emphasis on due process and equal protectionrather than "frontal" Eighth Amendment arguments, sounding in moral philosophy and explicit concern for the condemned -is "con servative" and consistent with the fairness-oriented "spirit of Furman. "148 By targeting these systemic concerns, Sarat contends, abolitionists are provided a position of political respectability while simultaneously allowing them to change the subject from the legitimacy of execution to the imperatives of due process, from the philosophical merits of killing the killers to the sociological question of the impact of state killing on our politics, law and culture ... [Abolitionists] can say that the most important issue in the debate about capital punishment is one of fairness, not one of sympathy for murderers, concern for the law abiding, not for the criminal. We should not let our central democratic and legal values be eroded just so that we can execute evildoers. (p. 253)
Sarat thus sells his "new abolitionism" as a preferable alternative to traditional abolitionism, which for the past several decades has 146. The move is somewhat jarring and serves as a reminder that several of the book's chapters were previously published elsewhere, being modified for purposes of inclusion in When the State Kills. In a broader sense, it suggests what might be perceived as uncertainty over the basic interdisciplinary approach advanced in the book, i.e., despite the promise of such scholarship, in the end, the anti-capital campaign is about basic legal and jurispruden tial concerns, not nuanced social construction. For discussions of the pitfalls of interdiscipli nary legal scholarship more generally, see Blackmun's abolitionism found its locus in neither liberal humanism nor radicalism nor re ligious doctrine, nor in the defense of the most indefensible among us. It is, instead, firmly rooted in the mainstream legal values of due process and equal protection and in a deep concern with what state killing does to the condition of America. Blackmun did not reject the death penalty because of its violence, argue against its inappropriateness as a response to heinous criminals, or criticize its futility as a tool in the war against crime. Instead, he shifted the rhetorical grounds.
P. 252. Similarly, much like Sarat, in backing a moratorium the ABA espoused a position of moral neutrality on the death penalty. See A.B.A., supra note 3.
148. P. 251. Furman's result, it is worth recalling, was animated by process-based con cerns, although cast as a successful Eighth Amendment challenge. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (opinion of Stewart, J., concurring) (condemning the death penalty as arbitrary and "capricious," making death "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual"); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (noting that "(t]he basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily").
[Vol. 100:1336 fruitlessly pursued a "frontal assault on the morality of state killing" (p. 251 ). It is a "kind of legal and political conservatism" that seeks to cultivate "anxiety" over the continued use of the death penalty and subvert its popularity based on its irreconcilable conflict with Ameri can legal ideals of fairness and equality, ideals embodied in our consti tutional texts and traditions (p. 252). In due course, Sarat hopes, no longer will opposition to capital punishment so much be synonymous with being "soft on crime"149 as · with fealty to cherished democratic traditions. Second, and perhaps more important, changing the subject permits the debate over capital punishment to be framed in terms more con ducive to .ultimate abolitionist victory. McVeigh, like predecessor death penalty "poster bc;lys" Eichman, Dahmer, and Gacy, put tradi tional abolitionists in a difficult spot. Compelled to subscribe to the principled position that state killing is always wrong, even for such singularly evil men, traditionalists risked being denounced as philo sophic zealots of questionable sincerity. To emphasize his point, Sarat offers an instance of how a "frontal" assault can do more harm than 151. P. 253-54. With these words, one senses that the abolitionist cause has been cowed by the sustained defense of pro-death forces such as Justice Antonin Scalia, and on Scalia's own terms. As Justice Scalia stated in response to Justice Blackmun's Eighth Amendment based renunciation of the death penalty in Callins:
If the people conclude that ... brutal deaths may be deterred by capital punishment; indeed, if they merely conclude that justice requires such brutal deaths to be avenged by capital punishment; the creation of false, untextual and unhistorical contradictions within "the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence" should not prevent them. If they admit that they, too, might want vengeance should a loved one be murdered; their efforts to take away the state's power to execute smacks of hypocrisy. But if they refuse to acknowledge the revenge motive, they appear detached and unfeeling. Indeed, the stereotype of abolitionists as disproportionately sympathetic to the guilty and deaf to the cries of in nocent victims has seriously compromised the legitimacy of the move ment.153
Sarat thus avoids being branded a zealot, and manages to comman deer the terrain of the death penalty debate by, as he suggests, chang ing the subject. The issue beco m es not whether McVeigh "deserves" death, or whether we as individuals would want to kill the murderer of a loved one. Rather, the focus is on the broader inimical effects of capital punishment on our law, society and culture.
Sarat's avowed desire to "ch a nge the subject," however, begs two questions: (1) can in fact the subject so readily be changed and (2) what are the potential consequences to abolitionism of such a strat egy?
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A. Changing the Subject
In seeking to convince Americans that capital punishment is inimi cal to their "condition," Sarat takes on a substantial, if not insuper able, task. Numerous studies have established that one's position on the death penalty is significantly influenced by broader, often deeply felt social and political views. On this question, people self-identify; they "do not so much form opinions [regarding the death penalty] as choose sides."154 Also, as Sarat recognizes, there is permanence to the urge to punish; what sociologist Emile Durkheim called the "expiatory character of punishment,"155 and the Gregg Court identified as soci ety's need to express "moral outrage at particularly offensive con duct."156 To be sure, the death penalty -given the relative infre quency of its application -possesses largely symbolic significance.157 But even symbolic sanction, as Durkheim so perceptively noted, plays a role: it affords society a chance to express moral solidarity; society gets to "express the unanimous aversion which the crime continues to inspire, by an authentic act which can consist only in suffering inflicted upon the agent."158 156. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) . The Court hastened to add that the outlet might be "unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs." Id.
Even more vexing, the persistent support for capital punishment might have a far deeper, more psychic dimension, if indeed executions serve as acts of "ritual human sacri fice," better explained "as an unconscious psychological defense mechanism against fear of mortality awareness than a deliberate practical response to crime." Donald P. Judges, Scared to Death: Capital Punishment as Authoritarian Terror Management, 33 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 155, 163, 181 (1999) ; cf MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 102-18 (1996) (pro viding a psychoanalytic, literature-based examination of the conflicting admiration and dis dain felt for criminal offenders). To Sarat, this visceral fealty to the death penalty is beside the point. It will endure regardless of'the·persuasiveness of abolitionist ar guments, and seeking to combat it can actually handicap abolitionism. However, it is worth asking whether the abolitionist cause can so eas ily sidestep what Sarat calls the "moral" underpinnings of capital pun ishment, the "simple and appealing retributivist rationale for capital punishment" (p. 249). The urge to punish capitally, although indulged at varying rates over the years, endures after centuries of criticism, and there is no reason to think it will dissipate on its own. Only today, however, has the public's core justification for the death penalty limned, with retribution finally having been laid bare.159 With other "respectable" rationales, such as the armatures of deterrence and cost effectiveness,160 now having fallen to the wayside, abolitionists are pre sented with a prime opportunity to at last squarely address and refute the harsh contours of lex talionis.
Moreover, by refusing to engage "moral" arguments, Sarat would also appear to miss an opportunity, or perhaps more precisely, miscast the terms of the debate. The systemic fault currently of most public salience -the immanent execution of innocents, both historically161 and today,162 which Sarat largely ignores163 -does indeed raise moral and philosophical concerns. This is because, above all, any punishment justified on retributive theory requires culpability.164 Recent public . In this regard, it bears mention that increasing use of DNA lessens but does not preclude the conviction of "factually innocent" defendants given that DNA is not always present at crime scenes; also, DNA analysis does nothing to exonerate or bar from death row defendants whose relative culpability makes them not "death-worthy" (i.e., "penalty innocent"). See id. at 857-58.
163. The only direct reference to innocence made in the book appears in its conclusion. Pp. 258-59.
164. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (stating that "[t)he heart of the retri bution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpabil ity of the criminal offender"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1981) (O'Connor, J., [Vol. 100:1336 opinion data suggest that information on innocence has discernible ef fect on the otherwise impregnable -retributive supporting rationale,165 at last providing some support for Justice Marshall's hypothesis,166 ironically, regarding a penal rationale he categorically rejected.167 The acknowledged propensity of the system to be influenced by bias,168 al though enjoying less resonance with the public,169 similarly undercuts retributivism. Armed with these data, abolitionists can undertake a "frontal assault," permitting them to seize the initiative and engage re tentionists on a more persuasive ground than theory alone.170 Rather dissenting) (stating that the death penalty is justified only when "the criminal gets his just deserts"). than focusing on fairness and equal protection (the mainstays of Sarat's strategy), concerns · research has shown are not decisive to Americans,171 abolitionists can undertake a "frontal" assault on the core retributive base of support, giving tangible form to the abstract question of whether it is "morally right" to impose the uniquely severe penalty of death, given the ineluctable faults of the capital process.172
More problematic, by avoiding old-style moral abolitionism, with its categorical quality, Sarat's tact might yield to the reformism em bodied in Gregg and implicitly endorsed by the proposed ABA Mora torium,17 3 perpetuating a legal complicity that advantages the status quo. 169 (1976) (stating that "the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution," and endorsing revamped capital system with legislatively enhanced controls).
175. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 164 (noting that "the benefits of capi tal punishment are symbolic: They lie in the statement executions make about the relation ship between the government and the offender; in the vindication of absolute and ultimate power appropriated to governmental ends, even if this only happens in small number of cases").
176. Under this view, death is to be reserved for those convicted of a "small category of extremely heinous crimes-such as assassinating the President, or murdering police officers or multiple victims." James R. Acker & Charles S.
' Lanier, Beyond Human Ability? The Rise and Fall of Death Penalty Legislation, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 77, 109. Such a limitation would be politically feasible be cause it preserves the "symbolic safety net represented by the death penalty," until such time as the public comes "to appreciate and accept that the remaining vestiges of capital punish ment are both unnecessary and ill-advised." Id. Alternatively, the road toward abolition could be charted by discrete categorical prohibitions, such as the execution of juveniles, also now getting traction. See A.B.A., supra note 3, at 220 (advocating same).
[Vol Albeit temporary, the Illinois moratorium supports the forecast of Professors Zimring and Hawkins that, other than the Supreme Court, the most likely path to abolition involves state governors, "the political officials most likely to regard the death penalty policy as being a crucial part of their responsibility and, the r efore, to take action." ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 155; see also id. at 156 (stating that "brave governors and even brave sena tors will have to take important roles in demythologizing the politics of capital punishment long before the Court acts to end executions"). The authors hasten to add, however, that "it should be remembered that state governors have very few models for this sort of bravery in recent American experience." Id. at 155.
B. The Consequences of Changing the Subject
Whatever the likely success of Sarat's tactical shift, a perhaps more interesting question looms: what, if any, adverse consequences possi bly flow from the singularly pragmatic stance he advocates?
Before addressing this question, it is important to identify what is new about Sarat's "new abolitionism" and to be clear about its tactical locus. To be sure, it self-consciously seeks tci distance itself from Justice Brennan's moral, "human dignity"-based categorical aboli tionism invoked in his Furman concurrence,1 82 long a blueprint for the abolitionist cause. Nor does it draw explicit support from traditional legal or jurisprudential analysis, which has taken its cues from the con stitutional claims pending before the Court1 83 or from social science re search, which for a time seemed to hold promise for abolition. 184 Rather, it is an approach that places premium importance on pub lic and legislative opinion, a tactical realm largely avoided by aboli tionists since Gregg when several members of the plurality cited the adverse response to Furman as affirmative evidence that the death penalty comported with "evolving standards of decency."185 Such ."objective" indicia have remained an important focus of the Court, with decidedly mixed results for abolitionists.1 86 There is irony in this (Vol. 100:1336 shift, however, as it is reminiscent of the Legal Defense Fund's pre Fu rman political efforts to abolish capital punishment,1 87 a campaign that showed tangible (if piecemeal and ephemeral) abolitionist re sults.188 In a sense, then, Sarat's new abolitionism is perhaps not so new after all.
While to many this approach will no doubt represent a much needed turn toward pragmatism and a tonic for the enervated state of abolitionism,1 89 Sarat's ready willingness to forsake the "high moral ground" might augur collateral trouble. His jettison of McVeigh, in particular, is emblematic of this. The sacrifice of the most politically despised without a fight itself suggests capitulation, or more precisely, a high-stakes barter in which the death penalty combatants seek to buy each other off, achieving a bargain reminiscent of Faust.190 The obvious risk is that, no matter how shrewd the tactic might appear in political terms; it undercuts the basic moral bearing of the anti-death penalty movement, heretofore a binding characteristic.191 Much like the absolutism characteristic of the debate over legalized abortion, the legitimacy of execution to date has not admitted of much middle 187. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 54; MELTSNER, supra note 30, at 106-25.
188. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 40-44, 78-79 (recounting how predominant focus on judicial abolitionism relegated political abolitionism to the margins, despite the fact that the latter showed incremental gains in the pre-Furman period); see also Muller, supra note 30, at 179 (noting that the litigation-specific focus of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund "simply did not consider the difficult task of public education on the death penalty issue as one of its important responsibilities").
·
189. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (commenting on enervated condition of abolitionism); ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 5 (1996) (noting that "no one can embark upon a study of the death penalty without making the commonplace observation that from a philosophical and policy standpoint there appears to be nothing new to be said").
190. For their part, death penalty supporters can avoid criticism over claims of inno cence, racism and inadequate legal counsel, taking heart that the "worst of the worst" do get death. Opponents can derive satisfaction in the reality that there will be fewer executions. Cf Sam Howe Verhovek, When Justice Shows Its Darker Side, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at D5 (quoting death penalty supporter's response to assertion that innocents have been con demned: "I would gladly give [abolitionists] a couple of questionable cases that they are harping about in return for ' their agreeing to recognize that in the vast majority of cases, there is no question of the guilt of those being executed").
191. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that the movement "has managed to avoid the factional splintering that has plagued other crusades in America").
ground.192 By evolving away from absolutism, however, the movement cannot shake an irreducible reality: .that .McVeigh, too, was a human being. Why was the government's act of exterminating McVeigh not "brutal," making us all complicit in his death? Does not the compul sion to execute so despised a person as McVeigh speak to Sarat's ulti mate subject: the "American condition"?193 Clarence Darrow likely would not have hesitated in his unequivocal affirmative response. 194 In addition, coupling abolitionism with political concerns carries substantial practical risk. While old-style moral abolitionism, such as advanced by Justice Brennan, was certainly susceptible to attack for its moral inflexibility, staking abolitionist hopes on the goal of persuading Americans of the evil of capital punishment presents risk of a precisely opposite kind. One need only consider the periodic wild swings in public support for punitiveness amid "crime waves"195 and anxiety producing world events196 to know of the significant volatility of public [Vol. 100:1336 views on the death penalty.1 9 7 In short, standards of decency can and do "evolve," and not always in the direction favored by abolitionists. It is entirely possible that, while legislatures and the public at-large might be expressing reserve about the death penalty today, in the near future a far greater level of acceptance might again come to the fore.
Finally, by eschewing a frontal assault, however difficult, the movement also forsakes the promise of achieving a much broader philosophic shift in American penology. As one commentator recently put it: "Criminal punishment has come to serve as a new civic religion of sorts for a society which worries about its ability to cohere, and the depths of our anxieties about our social solidarity express themselves in our conceptions of crime and in the corresponding severity of our punishment."1 98 The current social acceptability of execution as a form of retribution must be squarely addressed if society is to be purged of its desire to execute.1 99 As argued by Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, we as a society must "reject all claims to owning the death of anyone else. "200 In other words, something more than rhetoric and public perception is involved; the challenge goes to changing Ameri cans' core sensibility regarding punishment and atonement.201 Again, McVeigh affords a compelling example. If we can take him at his word, McVeigh's murderous treachery in Oklahoma City was in tended to "avenge" the deaths of the Branch Dividians. The federal government, rather than seeking atonement in some nonlethal way, perpetuated the killing cycle with its extinguishment of the wan McVeigh in the Terre Haute death chamber. With his execution, the government missed an optimal chance to reconfigure penal policy, precisely at the moment it would engender maximum respect.202
But all this goes to tactics, not substance. In the end, the para mount value of When the State Kills is that it advances an intellectual framework that allows abolitionists to reinvigorate their cause, which, despite some recent gains, has at best achieved a stand-off with pro death forces,203 and until very recently has been "virtually invisible."204 Rather than being a practical "how to" manifesto for the coming revolution,205 the book seeks to illuminate a new way of thinking and basis to communicate to ambivalent Americans the demonstrated faults of the capital system in a manner that (at last) meaningfully resonates. The important observations of Professor Sarat in When the State Kills should enrich the ongoing debate over capital punishment, and, as he seeks, afford yet more reason to question the continued use of the capital sanction. At the end of this important book, Sarat asks: "As we think about capital punishment, the faces we should be look ing at are our own. The question to be asked about state killing is not what it does for us, but what it does to us" (p. 250). The question re mains, however, whether what we see in the mirror will suffice to end state-sanctioned killing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Among the truisms imparted by Tocqueville was that "there is hardly a political question in the U.S. which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."206 This is surely true with respect to capital punishment -but with a t�ist. In the early 1970s death penalty aboli tionists, borrowing from the successful judicial strategy of the civil kind to some of the monstrous crimes that are a too frequent fe ature of late-twentieth century civilization").
203. Beschle, supra note 170, at 487 ("For decades, the death penalty has been one of the most passionately debated topics in American law .... Remarkably, though, when the principal arguments for and against the death penalty are examined closely, they seem in adequate to the task of either justifying the death penalty or proving convincingly that it must be abolished.").
